Lewinsohn himself probably disagrees with such examples, not least because he would prefer that the individual simply be able to assume the legal obligations he wishes, charitable or not, and, as such, criticizes in passing the abandonment of the seal and nominal consideration. See Lewinsohn, supra note 2, at 760-61. I think we need to explain why we should invest public funds in the implementation of private agreements. Too often, scholars may simply wonder how Williston did it and quote Lewinsohn with apparent consent: “Why not? . . . I do not understand why a man would not be able to be responsible if he wished. Id. at 760, quotes Samuel Williston, manual of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Procedures 194 (1925). We need more justification than “why not?” to invest public funds and state intrusion into private affairs, even with the agreement of those involved. Second, Lewinsohn makes little mention of performance contracts. That is a striking omission. Informal enforcement contracts would not be executed under the first contractual categories of federal common law and debt, as discussed above.51 An applicant who has not yet completed and may not have been harmed has a right to justice other than one who plowed a field or delivered cows without pay.

Even if it cannot claim any particular prejudice or enrichment for the defendant, it is still entitled to its good business in modern contract law. In other words, contract law is not correct in the way the law of disorder is. Contract law imposes, so to speak, unre violated benefits. It acknowledges that the parties have reached an agreement to obtain something and that they have implemented their plan. It is one thing to talk about “debt satisfaction” in one case where one part has occurred and the other has not; It is quite another to talk about debt satisfaction in a case where neither side has come forward so far. Maybe we can make a deal like that, but Lewinsohn can`t do it. In recent decades, much of the scholarship, which explores the theoretical basis of contract law, has focused on the purpose of existence, as a moral concept and social practice. In particular, over the past ten years, Jed Lewinsohn has corrected the equivalent in his excellent article on the Doctrine of Reflection Paid on Both Sides: Quid Pro Quo Exchange and the Doctrine of Consideration.2 In his excellent article on the Doctrine of Reflection Paid on Both Sides: Quid Pro Quo Exchange and the Doctrine of The Consideration. – Exchange.